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The U.S. has a long history of providing generous support for the agricultural sector.  A recent omnibus
package of farm legislation, the 2008 Farm Bill (P.L. 110-246) will provide in excess of $284 billion
in financial support to U.S. agriculture over the 2008-2012 period. Commodity program payments
account for $43.3 billion of this total.   Our paper is concerned with the distribution of these benefits.
Farm subsidies make agricultural production more profitable by increasing and stabilizing farm prices
and incomes.  If these benefits are expected to persist, farm land values should capture the subsidy
benefits.  We use a large sample of individual farm land values to investigate the extent of this capitalization
of benefits.  Our results confirm that subsidies have a very significant impact on farm land values and
thus suggest that landowners are the real benefactors of farm programs.  As land is exchanged, new
owners will pay prices that reflect these benefits, leaving the benefits of farm programs in the hands
of former owners that may be exiting production. Approximately 45% of U.S. farmland is operated
by someone other than the owner.  We report evidence that owners benefit not only from capital gains
but also from lease rates which incorporate a significant portion of agricultural payments even if the
farm legislation mandates  that benefits must be allocated to producers.  Finally, we examine rental
agreements for farmers that rent land on both a cash and share basis.  We find evidence that farm programs
that are meant to stabilize farm prices provide a valuable insurance benefit.
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The Distribution of Agricultural Subsidies
1 Introduction
A 2002 news report posed the following question. What do former basketball star Scottie
Pippen, publisher Larry Flynt, and stockbroker Charles Schwab all have in common? The
surprising answer is that all are recipients of farm program subsidies.1 Other notable payment
recipients include nine U.S. Members of Congress; David Rockefeller, former chairman of
Chase Manhattan and grandson of oil tycoon John D. Rockefeller, who received 99 times
more in subsidies than the median farmer; Ted Turner, the 25th wealthiest man in America,
who received 38 times more subsidies than the median farmer; and the late Kenneth Lay,
the ousted Enron CEO and multi-millionaire. (Reidl, 2004). Several Fortune-500 companies
have also received substantial farm program payments, including John Hancock Mutual
Insurance ($2.5 million in 2002), the Chevron corporation, and the Caterpillar corporation.
In arguing for program reforms, U.S. Senator Amy Klobuchar (D-MN) stated that \$3.1
million in farm payments went to the District of Columbia, $4.2 million has gone to people
living in Manhattan, and $1 billion of taxpayer money for farm payments has gone to Bev-
erly Hills 90210."2 The fact that support for U.S. \farmers" is often directed to individuals
and corporations that seem to be some distance from the farm has been the topic of consid-
erable debate in recent years, in particular since congressional support for U.S. agriculture
continues to expand. The 2008 Farm Bill (P.L. 110-246) will provide in excess of $284 billion
in nancial support to U.S. agriculture over the 2008-2012 period. Commodity program
payments account for $43.3 billion of this total.
To the extent that eligibility for government benets is tied to the ownership or operation
of certain assets, the market values of these assets will reect expected future benets.
1\Farm Subsidies Help Those Who Help Themselves," a Fox News report by William LaJeunesse, July
15, 2002. This article is available from http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,57602,00.html. These
statistics are all drawn from the Environmental Working Group's farm subsidy database (www.ewg.org).
2December 12, 2007 Senate oor statement of Senator Amy Klobuchar.
1Such is the case with farmland. Considerable variation exists in agricultural land values
across the U.S. (see Figure 1). USDA statistics indicate that 45.3% of U.S. farmland is
operated by someone other than the owner (USDA-NASS, 1999). Mishra et al. (2002)
report that, contrary to conventional wisdom, most agricultural landlords (57%) are non-
farm corporations or individuals that work in or are retired from nonfarm-related activities.
In light of these facts, a fundamental question arises regarding the distribution of farm
support programs and the extent to which those who operate the farms actually receive the
benets. This is a critical issue, not only for policymakers but also for farm operators who
should understand the extent of their gain from the various programs they tend to support.
The relevant question is, of course, who are the policies intended to benet? The capture
of agricultural benets by farmland values is problematic if the policies aim to support
farmers and these farmers do not own their land when the policies are announced. To the
extent that (young) expanding farmers are paying for the expected policy benets in the
farm assets they acquire, the present value of future benets is captured by the (old) sellers.
New owners only benet from surprise increases in public transfers. Given the large share of
U.S. farm land that is operated by tenant farmers, the extent to which lease rates capture
program benets is also important to the distribution of these benets.
The concern with the capture of agricultural policy benets by the initial land owners
is not new. A number of papers have attempted to estimate the capitalization of aggregate
agricultural transfers into farmland values.3 These papers suer from a number of short-
comings which we are able to address here through an empirical analysis of a unique set of
farm-level data. We contribute to the understanding of the distribution of farm subsidies in
several ways. First, we are able to investigate the dierential impact of the principal farm
programs because we are able to observe the breakdown of government payments at both the
farm and the county level. Second, because we know the location of each farm, we are able
3See Barnard et al. (1997), Goodwin and Ortalo-Magn e (1992), Ryan et al. (2001), Shertz and Johnston
(1997), Shoemaker et al. (1990), and Weersink et al. (1999). These papers only examine aggregate policy
eects on land values, thus ignoring the myriad eects of dierent programs. In addition, the extraction of
policy benets through lease arrangements has not been widely investigated. Important exceptions exist in
the recent studies of Kirwan (2009) and Patton et al. (2008), which we discuss below.
2to control for non-agricultural pressures on the land and determine how they aect its value.
Third, we observe not only land values but also the terms of lease arrangements and rates.
This puts us in a unique position to be able to assess directly the extent to which owners and
farmer operators share the benets of various agricultural programs, a useful complement to
the indirect assessment we obtain from investigating land values. Finally, variations in the
dierence between cash lease rates and share lease rates enables us to investigate the extent
to which the market values the insurance features built into some farm programs, a feature
ignored by the literature.
Our analysis makes use of a data set drawn from an annual survey of approximately
10,000 farms per year over the 1998-2005 period. This period was characterized by a variety
of dierent farm programs, including some which were not connected in any way to market
conditions or production, at least in theory. At the other extreme are output price-support
payments which are intimately tied to contemporaneous market conditions. We nd that
payments that are decoupled from output and are supposed to be transitory yield the smallest
eects on land values. Payments that may signal future benets, even in cases where they
are not a permanent part of farm legislation, have stronger eects. Price-support payments
have the strongest eects.
U.S. farm legislation typically intends benets to be \shared" between the owner and
operator of a farm. Under cash lease arrangements, the entire subsidy is sent to the op-
erator. However, the law does not regulate lease rates; they are set by the market. Our
empirical analysis indicates that owners extract a large proportion of farm benets from ten-
ants through the lease rates. From the study of lease rates, we also nd that programs with
strong insurance objectives, such as output-price support payments, signicantly aect the
gap between cash and share lease rates. In particular, the share rate premium is signicantly
diminished by programs that serve to lower the risk associated with uncertain farm earnings.
This nding provides direct evidence of the land market pricing the insurance component of
agricultural policy.
3Accounting for the benets of decreased earnings volatility raises two issues with the
traditional approach to the assessment of the contribution of agricultural policy to farm
land values. First, the insurance feature of several governmental programs raises questions
about the traditional implicit assumption that a dollar of transfer today conveys the same
information about future transfers, regardless of market conditions and local agricultural
output characteristics. Instead, a low price support payment this year may be due to high
market prices and thus in no way indicates a decrease in the expected stream of long run
benets from the price support program. Second, those government transfers whose level
are negatively correlated with farm earnings from the market decrease the volatility of farm
land returns. They must therefore decrease the discount rate required to hold farm land and
thus the discount rate applied to earnings from the market. Hence, regression estimates of
the contribution of market earnings to the value of land depend on the policy environment.
In particular, it is wrong to assume that such estimates would not change to reect a more
volatile environment if price support programs were to be dismantled.
We have noted that the empirical literature has largely been focused on policy eects
on land values and the incidence of policy benets in rental arrangements|which is an
increasingly prominent feature of US agriculture|has not received the same level of scrutiny.
Two important exceptions lie in the recent analysis of Kirwan (2009) and Patton et al. (2008),
who both evaluated the eects of policy benets on land rental rates. Kirwan (2009) used
farm-level panel data taken from the 1992 and 1997 Agricultural Censuses to evaluate the
incidence of policy benets in farmland rental arrangements. However, the census data only
included rents for land leased on a cash or free basis and he therefore largely ignored the
potentially important role of share lease contracts. In the sample of farms evaluated in this
analysis, 63.6% of the farms reported renting land and, of those that rented land, 36.3%
reported leasing land on a share basis. As Kirwan points out, to the extent that a signicant
share of rented land is leased under share arrangements, this may raise an errors-in-variables
problem that results in biases if the measurement error is correlated with policy benets.
Kirwan undertook an analysis intended to demonstrate that the biases raised by ignoring
4share lease arrangements were modest. To do so, he used a single year of data from a related
survey, the Agricultural Economics Land Owners Survey (AELOS) in 1999, to investigate
the extent to which the measurement error in rental rates arising from the omission of share
rents resulted in biases in his estimates of benet incidence. On the basis of results for this
single year, he concluded that the biases were small and generally positive. While these
arguments are persuasive, the reliance upon a single year of data in a case where policy
benets are very dependent upon market conditions in any given year may make it hard to
generalize his results. Further, as we argue below, it may be important to segregate benets
across dierent policy types since the eects on land values and rents may vary substantially
for dierent types of policies|a point demonstrated by Goodwin, Mishra, and Ortalo-Magn e
(2003b).
An important point of relevance is the signicant variety of agricultural programs used
by policymakers to convey support to the farm sector (see Appendix Table 1 below). Kirwan
(2009) argues that policy benets after the 1996 Farm Bill were exogenously determined by
underlying program parameters. As we discuss in greater detail below, this is not entirely
the case since a wide range of policies are used to convey benets to agricultural producers.
Although certain payments were exogenously determined by Congressional mandate and
were known with certainty over the life of the legislation, other signicant benets, including
price supports, disaster payments, and market loss payments were not exogenously known
prior to the year in which they were received.
Patton et al. (2008) draw a careful distinction between payments that are \coupled" and
\decoupled." Although disagreement exists over what constitutes coupling of payments, a
formal denition is aorded by Annex 5 of the 1996 WTO Uruguay Agreement on Agriculture
(URAA), which denes a decoupled payment as one that is not dependent upon production
or price in the year in which it is made. Patton et al. (2008) adopt an instrumental variables
approach to recognize the fact that payments are not known with certainty at the time
rental contracts are determined and thereby represent expected values of policy benets
by using instruments. We follow a similar approach in certain portions of our analysis.
5Their results indicate that dierent types of agricultural policy benets have dierent eects
on rental rates, thereby conrming the earlier assertions of Goodwin, Mishra, and Ortalo-
Magn e (2003a) that predicted such dierential eects. Patton et al.'s (2008) results also
raise important questions regarding the validity of the assumed operation of agricultural
programs and modeling of benet incidence presented by Kirwan (2009).
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. The next section gives a brief
overview of the history and nature of U.S. farm programs. We are particularly concerned
with providing a careful description of the dierent mechanisms commonly used to convey
policy benets to U.S. agricultural producers. Section three discusses issues pertaining to
model specication, estimation, and measurement of the relevant variables. The fourth
section presents the results of our empirical analysis and discusses their implication for the
distribution of agricultural policy benets. The nal section oers some concluding remarks.
2 A Brief Overview of U.S. Farm Policy
Most U.S. farm programs have their origins in the New Deal legislation of the Great Depres-
sion. A variety of price and income support programs have been used over time to increase
and stabilize farm earnings. These programs are revised approximately every 5 years by
an omnibus \Farm Bill" package of legislation. In addition to this major package of farm
programs, support is provided through a number of other legislative channels. This is the
case with farm programs such as crop insurance and conservation measures. On a regular
basis, agriculture also benets from ad hoc support (though emergency bills) that is not a
part of any budgeted legislation.
Over most of its history, U.S. agricultural policy has used price supports coupled with
production controls, with the declared objective to provide income support to the farm
sector. Some support was made on the basis of a need for \parity" with the high relative
agricultural prices of 1910.4 In more recent times, support was provided only to program
4Though any link with market and production conditions in 1910 would seem dicult to make, arguments
in favor of such \parity" pricing are still heard on occasion in farm policy debates.
6crops (corn, wheat, cotton, rice, grain sorghum, rye, barley, and oats). Deciency payments,
determined by the dierence between market and target prices, were paid to producers on
the basis of their \base" acreage and yields. This base reected historical production (in
most cases, acreage and yields during the 1980s). The fact that price supports were tied to
historical production patterns implied a lack of planting exibility for producers. In addition,
soybeans, a major U.S. crop, was largely omitted in provisions for support due to the fact
that it was not an important crop when most farm programs began.
In 1996, Congress agreed to what was intended to be a major overhaul of U.S. farm
policy|the Farm and Agricultural Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act. This Act is also
known as the \Agricultural Market Transition Act" or AMTA. The nomenclature \Reform"
and \Market Transition" was meant to indicate a major shift in policy away from government
involvement and toward market oriented policies. Eligibility for price support was no longer
based upon historical production|producers were free to plant whatever crops they desired
and prices were supported at a legislatively-determined loan rate. Soybeans were made
eligible for price supports, which were now provided through the \Loan Deciency Payment"
(LDP) program. LDP payments were made on the basis of the dierence between market and
support prices (the loan rates). The rhetoric accompanying the Act implied, in principle at
least, that the legislation signaled a transition to an environment with limited government
support. A program of direct payments to those producers with base acreage (historical
rights to program benets) was instituted to compensate producers over this transition, at
least in theory. These payments were known as AMTA or Production Flexibility Contract
(PFC) payments. By design, AMTA payments were completely decoupled from the market|
the only requirement for receiving AMTA payments was that the producer (or landowner)
had to have base acreage. Eligibility for such payments in no way depended upon current
production patterns. In some cases, payments were made on land no longer in production.
The AMTA payments were set to decline each year until the FAIR Act expired in 2002.
Of course, the extent to which such payments were perceived to be temporary is a subject
of debate, especially since the payments were continued (and even increased) in the 2002
7and 2008 Farm Bills. Further, the 2002 Farm Bill allowed landowners the option to update
their base acreage using production and yields over the 1998-2001 period. Many critics of
U.S. farm programs have argued that this updating made it much harder to characterize the
payments as decoupled, since farmers and landowners may factor such updating possibilities
into their future production decisions.
Over its history, U.S. farm policy has provided benets through three general channels|
price supports (sometimes tied to acreage restrictions) that are tied to production (i.e.,
benets are provided on a per-unit basis), decoupled income support, which has no pro-
duction requirements, and disaster or market assistance payments, which provide benets
intended to oset poor production or bad market conditions. Since the 1996 Farm Bill,
U.S. agricultural policy has been characterized by three specic program mechanisms, to-
gether with a large collection of various minor programs. These mechanisms include the
aforementioned direct payments (PFC and xed, direct payments), market loss assistance
and counter-cyclical payments (payments that are triggered by low prices but are not tied
to current production), and loan deciency payments and marketing loans, which use loan
rates to support market prices. Each of these policies functions in unique ways to provide
support.
Direct payments were introduced in 1996 and were specied for the subsequent 7 years.
Payment recipients knew in advance exactly what their payments would be since they were
determined exogenously. However, other major components of farm program benets are not
known in advance. Market loss assistance and its successor|counter-cyclical payments|are
triggered by low market prices. The market loss assistance program which was introduced
in 1999 was entirely ad-hoc and was determined outside of the farm bills. Its successor,
counter-cyclical payments, formally brought these price supporting payments into the farm
legislation. In both cases, these programs are triggered by market prices falling beneath a
legislatively dened target price. Because market prices are not realized until after harvest,
agents do not know what payments will be in advance.
8Figure 2 illustrates the evolution of these three types of payment programs over the last
20 years. Note that coupled price supports and counter-cyclical payments are very volatile
from year to year. This is because they are based on market prices.5 The xed, decoupled
payments, which were known in advance over the life of the legislation, began in 1996 and
are much less variable by design.
The important point regarding these payment programs is that, contrary to arguments
advanced in the literature (e.g., Kirwan 2009), the bulk of farm program payment benets is
not predetermined by legislation and payments are not known in advance because they are
triggered by market conditions. Such arguments simply mischaracterize the basic operation
of farm programs. Agents' actions and the eects of policy on asset values and rental
agreements will therefore be based upon expectations of such payments|a point well noted
by Goodwin, Mishra, and Ortalo-Magn e (2003b) and Patton et al. (2009). Further, the
level of support varies substantially from year to year and thus any analysis that focuses on
one or two years (e.g., the 1992 and 1997 Census years or the 1999 AELOS survey year) is
faulty since benets will most certainly reect market conditions in those two years, which
are volatile over time but highly systemic in nature, and therefore highly correlated in the
cross-section.
Ad hoc disaster assistance has been a xture in U.S. agricultural policy for many years.
Periods of drought or poor market conditions frequently trigger ad hoc assistance labeled as
disaster payments. Under provisions of other farm legislation (the Crop Insurance Reform
Act of 1994), Congress stated an intention to make subsidized insurance the only mechanism
for providing disaster relief.6 However, localized droughts and low market prices led Congress
to rapidly retreat from this position and conclude that the support provided to farmers under
the FAIR Act was not sucient. Ad hoc assistance, in the form of yield compensations
and the aforementioned payments for low market prices (market loss assistance), were then
5This degree of volatility increases substantially when one considers individual commodities and support
at lower levels of aggregation (i.e., the state or county).
6As an aside, an interesting policy situation exists for crop insurance, which recently has returned about
$2.00 in indemnity payments for every dollar of premiums paid by farmers. This program, also in existence
since the 1930s, runs hand-in-hand with ad hoc disaster assistance|a form of free insurance. Note that
disaster assistance is an obvious impediment to a well-functioning insurance program.
9instituted. Again, such support cannot be perfectly anticipated since it is based upon random
production and market conditions.
A number of other programs have been important to agricultural policy. For example, a
considerable amount of farm land (approximately 35 million acres) has been removed from
production through the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP). The CRP pays producers
annual rents to place their land in reserve under a ten-year lease agreement. In order to be
eligible for the CRP program, land must be \erodible" and environmentally fragile. Such
land is typically of a lower value in terms of crop production.
In spite of rhetoric to the contrary, congressional support for U.S. agriculture continues
to expand. President Bush signed an omnibus package of farm program support on May
13, 2002 that was scored at $190 billion. The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008
(P.L. 110-246) was enacted into law on June 18, 2008. These two packages of farm programs
did not make substantial changes to farm policy. Notable is the fact that direct, decoupled
payments were maintained in both farm bills, thereby eliminating any doubt regarding the
extent to which these payments were transitory. One important exception to this general lack
of change in programs occurred in the introduction of \counter-cyclical payments" (CCPs)
in the 2002 Farm Bill. These payments formally brought the ad-hoc market loss assistance
support that characterized the late 1990s into farm legislation. The CCP program established
target prices for program commodities. If market prices fall beneath a target, payments are
made on the basis of the price deciency and the base yield and acreage. The CCP program
was continued with little modication in the 2008 Farm Bill.7
Congressional debate over the 2008 farm legislation and the generous level of support
that emerged from these deliberations have made clear Congress's intent to continue tax-
payer support for agriculture. The most recent policy debate centered on means-testing
for payment eligibility and limits on the amount of payments any individual could receive.
Under the 2002 Farm Bill, individuals with an adjusted gross income over $2.5 million were
7The 2008 Farm Bill did introduce an optional alternative to the CCP program|the Average Crop
Revenue Election (ACRE) program. Enrolling farmers agreed to cuts in some program benets and the
elimination of CCP payments in order to obtain a crop revenue guarantee. Only about 12.8% of eligible
acreage was enrolled in the ACRE program.
10ineligible for payments unless more than 75% of this total came from agriculture. Payments
to an individual farm were limited to $360,000, although price support payments made on
actual production were essentially unlimited due to program loopholes. The 2008 Farm
Bill essentially removed payment limits on coupled support and provided limited income
limitations on some payments.8
In all, support for agriculture remains strong in the U.S. Congress. A wide variety of
programs are used to convey signicant benets to the farm sector. The latest omnibus
farm bill is projected to cost U.S. taxpayers nearly $300 billion to provide agricultural and
nutritional support.
3 Modeling Framework
3.1 The Income Approach to Farm Land Valuation
All government transfers help the farmers in at least one of two ways: by raising the returns
to farming and by decreasing the volatility of these returns. The LDP and DP programs
have major insurance components. The AMTA payments are lump sum transfers determined
by farmers' activities prior to their implementation. The same is true with CRP payments;
they are lump sum additions to the return of farming that are uncorrelated with present or
future earnings from the market. In addition to all these transfers, farm land also gives the
farmer the opportunity to generate non-agricultural earnings. The jackpot is to own land
in an area under strong urban pressure with friendly zoning authorities, hence providing
the opportunity to realize substantial capital gains by converting the land to residential or
commercial use.
The value of a parcel of land is the present discounted value of expected cash ows from
agricultural activities plus the value of the option to convert the land to non-agricultural
8In particular, a person or legal entity with adjusted farm gross income of over $750,000 is not eligible
for direct (decoupled) payments. A person or entity with average adjusted gross non-farm income in excess
of $500,000 is not eligible for any program payments. However, the legislation allowed a husband and wife









where MKT and DP denote earnings from the market and from disaster payments, CONV
is the value of the conversion option, and r is the discount factor. The discount factor reects
the risk of the overall portfolio of individual streams of cash ow. This risk is not simply the
sum of the individual risks because of the non-zero covariance, by design, between MKT
payments, LDP and DP.
As mentioned earlier, AMTA and CRP are, for the most part, lump sum transfers whose
levels are independent of current and future earnings from MKT, LDP and DP, and from
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where r1, r2 and r3 denotes the discount factors for output related earnings, AMTA payments,
and CRP payments, respectively.
Implicit in equation (2) is the assumption of a constant discount rate. If we are willing to
assume that farm land buyers and sellers expect the various earnings to grow at a constant
rate, then the regression coecients we will obtain will be the inverse of the capitalization


















where the cap rates are denoted by :. It is easy to check that if a stream of cash ows is
expected to grow at the constant rate g and is discounted at the constant rate r, then the
cap rate  satises  = r   g.
To estimate the contribution of each source of value in equation (3), we need estimates of
expected next period cash ows for each source of agricultural earnings. This raises a serious
measurement issue. As mentioned above, it has been largely ignored in the literature which
tends to rely on current payments as an indicator of future payments. This is the issue to
which we now turn.
123.2 Measuring Expected Cash Flows
Let us suppose that agents correctly assess the true determinants of land values but the
econometrician, working with actual realizations of policy outcomes from year to year, is un-
able to observe these determinants. Instead the econometrician relates the observable annual
realizations of market and policy outcomes to land prices. In this case, the econometrician is
confronted with the classical errors in the explanatory variables problem. Errors-in-variables
results in an attenuation bias that forces coecients toward zero and thus yields inconsis-
tent estimates.9 This problem is compounded by the fact that the government operates more
than one program of payments, hence suggesting that traditional empirical approaches suer
from multiple explanatory variables observed with error.
A complicating factor arises in that the errors applying to observed policy benets may be
correlated in a typical sample. This correlation may assume two dierent forms|correlation
of the errors across dierent programs (for a given farm) and correlation of errors across
dierent farms in a sample. Both circumstances are likely to exist when one considers a
pooled cross-section of farms (as is the case in our empirical analysis). Consider a case of
two programs|price supports and market loss assistance payments. The extent of support
provided from the government is likely to vary considerably from year to year according to
market conditions. Low price years realize larger payments for both programs. Thus, the
errors associated with using realized benets are likely to be highly correlated across the
programs. The correlation could also be negative. Consider the case of yield disaster relief
and price supports. In low yield years, market prices are likely to be high and thus price
support payments will be low, though disaster benets will be higher to compensate for the
production shortfalls.
Another form of correlation is likely to be relevant when a pooled sample of individual
farms is considered. Since realized program benets are dependent upon aggregate market
conditions, the errors are likely to be highly correlated across observational units (farms) in
9This problem is analogous to the standard omitted variable problem, where the omitted factor is the
dierence between what is observed and the true, latent value.
13a given year. In a sample consisting of only a few years of data, the correlation across farms
increases the estimation error and may further exaggerate the bias; year-to-year shocks may
not average out when only a few years are observed.
Furthermore, if realizations are highly correlated across units within a year, parameter
estimates may shift considerably from year to year. If only a few years are observed, the
estimates from a pooled sample may be sensitive to events in the years observed and thus
may vary substantially across years and be more variable in a pooled analysis.10
The standard approach to addressing this problem is to obtain instruments or proxy
variables for those latent variables that are measured with error. An instrument should be
correlated with the variable of interest but uncorrelated with the error pertaining to the
observation. We represent the expected payment benets by constructing average values
of each relevant policy variable over the preceding four years. This approach raises one
complicating factor. As we discuss in detail below, our data set is not a true panel in that
a dierent set of farms is sampled each year|meaning that repeated observations for an
individual farm are not available.
To represent expected payment benets, we utilize the four-year average value of real
payments per farm acre in the county where the individual farm is located.11 We argue that
this is a superior measure of long-run expected benets as compared to realized payments
because values in the county more closely represent the long-run potential benets associated
with agricultural policy. Payments on an individual farm, in contrast, may reect individual
policy choices and characteristics of the farm operation. Transfer of the land to a new
operator may result in dierent subsidy realizations (for example, because of a dierent crop
mix) which are better represented using county-level averages.12
10See Goodwin, Mishra, and Ortalo-Magn e (2003b) for a quantitative assessment of this issue in the farm
land valuation context.
11A standard instrumental variables estimation approach is also feasible, though the fact that payment
realizations in any given year may be very weakly tied to long run expected benets makes the utility of such
an approach limited. This problem is exacerbated in a short sample when realizations are highly correlated
in the cross section, as is true in our application.
12Observations for an individual farmer in a particular year might reect crop rotation patterns. We
expect county level acreage to be more reective of the expected crop mix.
14We adopt a number of dierent historical averages to represent expected policy benets.
We use a four year average of county level total payments in our aggregate policy models.
In contrast, because LDPs were not the main instrument for providing price support prior
to the 1996 Farm Bill, we use a two-year average for LDP payments at the county level. We
should note that this errors-in-variables problem does not apply to all sources of government
subsidies. Subsidies provided through AMTA payments and rents earned on land enrolled
in the CRP program are known with certainty a priori. It is only those payments that are
triggered by market and production events (price supports and disaster payments) that must
be proxied.
3.3 Data
The primary source of our farm-level data is a data set collected from a large sample of farms
through the USDA's National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) Agricultural Resource
Management Survey (ARMS) project. The ARMS survey is a large probability-weighted,
stratied sample of about 8,000-20,000 U.S. farms each year. The survey collects detailed
government payments information for individual farm program benets as well as extensive
farm and operator characteristics. We focus on data collected over the years 1998-2005.
Thus, our empirical analysis focuses on these years. All monetary values in our sample were
adjusted to 2005 equivalent real values by deating by the consumer price index. Given the
relatively short nature of our sample, such deation had only minor eects on the results.
Besides detailed farm earnings, the survey also reports farm land value. Farm operators
are asked to estimate the market value as of December 31 of the preceding year of their land,
dwellings, and other farm buildings and structures. We restrict our attention to the value of
land only (excluding trees and orchards).13
In order to eliminate hobby and retirement type farms and to focus on commercial agri-
cultural operations, we eliminated any farm of less than 50 total acres. We also excluded
13Condentiality of responses is maintained and farmers do not have any incentive to distort their response
to the survey.
15farms located in counties with less than 100 total farm acres, thereby excluding urban coun-
ties that have no production agriculture. We excluded farms for which incomplete data were
available. This left us with a small number of extreme outlier observations (land values
less than $200 per acre or those exceeding $20,000 per acre). Such extreme observations
represent non-typical agricultural properties, such as vineyards and properties with charac-
teristics (e.g., river-side properties) not recorded in the survey. Only a very small number of
observations (less than 1%) were excluded on this basis. In the portion of our analysis that
addresses rental markets, we excluded any observation for which a share or cash lease rate
in excess of $1,000 per acre was reported. Again, such outliers occurred in only a very small
number of cases.
A variety of sources were used to collect county-level observations on crop acreage
and state level prices (unpublished USDA-NASS statistics) and data relevant to county
population and trends (unpublished U.S. Census data). Aggregate (county-level) agricul-
tural market performance (total sales and production costs) and population statistics were
taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics' (BLS) \Regional Economic Information System"
(REIS). Total farm acres for each county were taken from the 1997, 2002, and 2007 Agri-
cultural Censuses. We used linear splines to interpolate between census years. In that these
values evolve slowly over time but vary signicantly in the cross-section, such interpolation
should provide valid estimates in non-census years. Unpublished data on calendar-year total
program payments at the county level for individual farm programs were collected from the
Farm Service Agency (FSA) of the USDA.
Our empirical approach involves consideration of farm-level observations of land values,
cash rental rates, and share rental rates. We use explanatory variables that are measured
at the farm level as well as at a more aggregate county level. It is important to note that
this is not analogous to analysis at the county level as the left-hand-side variables in our
empirical models are measured at the farm-level. Further, in our models of actual realized
payment benets, the right-hand-side explanatory factors are also measured at the farm
16level. In the case of models that utilize aggregate averages of payment benets, right-hand-
side explanatory factors are constant across all farms within a county while the dependent
variables of interest vary within and across counties. It is relevant to note that, because the
ARMS is a national survey, it is uncommon for a large number of farms to be sampled in a
single county. In our estimation sample, each county had an average of 1.15 farms each year
and the number of farms sampled per county ranged from 1 to 7.
Summary statistics and denitions for the key variables of our analysis are presented
in Table 1. To the variables aimed at capturing expected cash ows from farming, we
added three factors intended to represent the additional value of land in areas facing non-
agricultural pressures. First, to represent non-agricultural demand pressures, we included the
population growth rate in each county. We also include a series of discrete indicator variables
(obtained from the USDA) that represent the extent of urbanization for each county. The
ordinal ranking ranges from 1=rural to 4=urban. Finally, we considered the ratio of total
population to total farm acres to again capture the eects of residential and non-agricultural
commercial demands for farm land.
We are interested in evaluating the dierential eects of benets provided by the govern-
ment versus those returns generated by the market. Of course, a risk-neutral farmer will not
care where a dollar comes from, though alternative sources of revenue may have dierent
levels of risk, thus aecting the preferences of a risk-averse farmer. We acknowledge at the
outset that any representation of market earnings should not be interpreted as a measure
of the market returns that would be generated in the absence of farm policy. Returns in
such a situation are dicult to assess, especially in light of the long history of government
involvement in U.S. agriculture. Likewise, the relevance of such a consideration is limited|it
is unlikely, to the authors at least, that the U.S. government will completely remove policies
that currently support agriculture. Having acknowledged these limitations, we construct
a measure of net returns from the market using county-level averages of the dierence in
total agricultural sales receipts (exclusive of government payments) and total production
costs (dollars per acre of farm land). We considered using measures of market returns from
17individual farm records. However, farm-level nancial records are highly volatile across in-
dividual years and individual farms due to any number of idiosyncratic factors and therefore
we use the county-wide average to represent market returns.
A few nal aspects of the construction of our sample merit discussion. The ARMS survey
is conducted annually from a stratied random sample of farms. Strata are dened by farm
size, sales class, and area. While it is possible that individual farms may be sampled in
multiple years, the identity of any individual farm is unknown (at least to the researcher),
though we do know the county in which the farm was located. Thus, it is impossible to
track an individual farm across time and, ever if such identication were possible, it is likely
that farms would be sampled infrequently and without regularity. This fact complicates
inferences in that unobserved heterogeneity concerns and endogeneity of key variables may be
dicult to address using standard econometric practices. Our use of county-level aggregates,
which should be exogenous to individual farm observations, alleviates these concerns in many
cases.14
A second point of relevance pertains to the timing of production decisions, including
rental agreements, and the administration of the survey. In most cases, rental agreements
are set prior to planting and in some cases may be long-term agreements that extend across
multiple years. Such agreements are therefore clearly based upon expected values of returns
and policy benets. A subtle dierence exists in the case of land values. Farm operators are
asked to assess the value of their land holding as of December 31 of the previous year. Such
an assessment would be made with full knowledge of realized returns and policy benets.
However, in that returns and program payments are very time-dependent, observed returns
and payments may not accurately reect the long-run expected values that inuence land
values and rental rates|a point demonstrated by Goodwin, Mishra, and Ortalo-Magn e
(2003a). We therefore use an average of the preceding ve years for individual program
payments and county-level market returns. The extent to which a ve-year historical average
accurately represents long-run expected values is debatable but such a measure should control
14Approaches to directly addressing endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity remain important topics
for future research.
18for year-specic eects that may move realized benets in any given year far from expected
values.15
4 Empirical Results
Our empirical analysis utilizes three distinct approaches to modeling policy eects on land
values and rental rates. The rst simply considers the eect of farm-level, realized payments
on farm-level land values and rental rates. This approach is analogous to that adopted in
many studies (see, for example, Kirwan(2009)) and ignores the fact that payment benets are
largely unknown at the time asset values and rental arrangements are determined. A second
approach constructs explicit measures of expected policy benets by considering an average
of historical county-level aggregates. A third approach adopts an instrumental variables
model in which the aggregate measures of policy benets are used to form instruments
that represent expected payments in a generalized method of moments (GMM) context. In
the case of standard regression models, we also considered clustered and robust standard
error estimation techniques. We allowed for clustering among regions, states, counties, and
population weights. Controlling for clustering generally produced larger standard errors but
did not alter the overall conclusions of the analysis. We present conventional standard errors
in the results contained below.
We rst consider the relationship between land values and agricultural policy benets.
As we have noted, our individual farm-level data are collected using a complex survey de-
sign. The individual strata used in collecting the data are not identiable, again reecting
condentiality considerations. This precludes eciency gains that could be achieved from
incorporating information about the construction of strata. However, we can observe popu-
lation weights for each farm and thus have pursued both weighted and unweighted regression
methods. In every case, the weighted and unweighted results were quite similar and thus we
15Consider, for example, basic price supports. These programs (e.g., deciency payments) support prices
by making a payment any time market prices fall beneath a target support level. In a year of strong prices,
no payments may be made. However, in light of the considerable volatility of basic commodity prices, a
subsequent year may realize substantial payments due to low prices.
19only present unweighted results.16 However, the unweighted results which follow should be
interpreted as applying to this sample of farms only and should not be directly extended to
the entire population.
Our analysis of the determinants of land values is conducted in three segments. In the
rst, we consider models that aggregate all program payments into a single category. Such
a model is useful in that it provides a summary of the impacts of additional federal subsidy
dollars on land values at the margin. This analysis also permits a straightforward comparison
to the large literature on this topic. Two versions of this model are considered. The rst uses
actual, observed payments for each farm. The second uses county-level historical averages to
assess the total, expected per-acre receipts from farm program payments. Note again that
expected payments are represented using the county average over the preceding ve year
period. The results are presented in Table 2.
The model using actual observed farm-level payments (Model 1) indicates that $1 of farm
payments tends to add $2.93 per-acre to the value of farm land. The eect, though highly
statistically signicant, is unreasonably low and suggests a very high rate of discounting
payment benets (approximately a 30% rate of discounting). Such a high rate of discounting
would necessarily imply that land market agents either anticipate the elimination of such
benets or that considerable uncertainty exists regarding the future of agricultural programs.
Neither explanation seems persuasive in light of the previous 70 years of generous support
for U.S. agriculture.
It is interesting to compare the eects of government payments on land values to the
eects of market returns. The results indicate that an additional $1 obtained from the
market would raise land values by $3.14, a gure very similar to what is implied for subsidy
payments. The results reect the expected inuences of urban pressures on land values, with
more highly populated and less rural areas having higher land values. Although these urban
eects are interesting in their own right, it is important that they be accounted for (a step
16Because strata are dened using size and sales class, dropping very small farms from our sample mitigates
bias concerns resulting from the non-random sampling, at least to a degree. Weighted regression results are
available from the authors on request.
20that has generally been neglected in previous analyses) in order to obtain accurate measures
of the policy eects on land values.17 Land in the most rural areas tends to be values at
$1,395 per acre less than that in the most urban areas, other things constant. Population
growth and a greater population relative to agricultural land in a county also both positively
contribute to land values.
We have argued that the use of observed payments may result in an attenuation bias
that forces the implied capitalization rates toward zero. As an alternative, we have argued
that a measure of expected payments may be preferred. Model 2 replaces the total realized
payment measure with the ve-year average measure noted above. As expected, the results
suggest much larger and more reasonable eects of agricultural policy benets on agricultural
land values. An additional $1 of government payments raises land values by $13.13 per acre.
Such a nding implies a much more reasonable capitalization rate of policy benets into
agricultural land values. The eect of historical average market returns is quite similar
across the alternative models, with an additional $1 of net market returns corresponding
to an increase of $3.45 in land values. The fact that market returns appear to be much
more heavily discounted than is the case for government payments may seem puzzling at
rst glance. However, an examination of the historical patterns of returns and payments
may help to explain this nding. Figure 3 below illustrates the patterns of net returns
(given by total marketings less total production costs) and total government payments over
the 1970-2006 period. Three dierent levels of aggregation are presented|the entire U.S.,
Iowa (a major agricultural state), and Kossuth County Iowa (a major agricultural county
in Iowa). In each case, the diagram illustrates the fact that real net farm market returns
have been falling over time and that market returns are much more volatile than government
payments. In many cases, net returns from the market are actually negative. Aggregation
conceals much of the volatility in returns that is actually present at the farm level. This
is demonstrated by the increased level of volatility across the successively less aggregated
statistics. At the individual farm level, at least to the extent that individual risks are not
17Hardie et al. (2001) estimate the eects of urban pressure on agricultural land. They are not concerned,
however, with the contribution of agricultural policy to the returns from land.
21perfectly correlated across farms, one would expect an even higher level of variation in net
market returns.
In light of the observed behavior of market returns over time, a high degree of dis-
counting by risk averse agents is not unexpected. Of course, one cannot fully decouple
market returns from government payments, since most agricultural programs are intended
to provide counter-cyclical benets intended to oset decreases in market earnings. Such
counter-cyclical behavior is evident in the diagrams in that benets are higher when market
returns fall. It is important to again emphasize that it is not our intention to interpret the
full or average impact of payments and thereby to make inferences about the total impact of
payments on land values. Such inferences may be impossible given the fact that payments
are so deeply embedded in asset markets and are so closely tied to market swings. Rather,
our intent is to examine marginal impacts of changes in payments and market returns on
land values|the eects that are represented by our model coecients.
A second segment of the analysis breaks out the overall government payments into their
individual components, generated from dierent programs. We have argued that it is likely
that dierent policies, which operate through widely varied support mechanisms, may have
dierent eects on land values. Models 3 and 4 use actual payment receipts and our measure
of expected payments (historical averages), respectively. We segment payments into four
dierent components. The rst consist of LDP payments, which includes marketing loan
gains and deciency payments in years prior to 1996. These payments are directly tied
to production and are intended to support the price of actual production of commodities.
A second component of payments is direct payments. This is comprised of payments that
are not tied to production but rather are based upon historical \base" acreage and yield,
which was largely established in the early 1980s.18 These payments include direct, decoupled
payments, market loss assistance, and counter-cyclical payments. Although these payments
are all based upon historical base production and are not tied to current production and
acreage, the market loss and counter-cyclical payments are triggered by market prices and
18The 2002 Farm Bill gave landowners the option of updating their base using 1998-2001 production and
acreage records.
22thus may not be known in advance.19 Ad-hoc disaster payments are also identied separately
and are included in the disaggregated regression. A distinction between the aggregate and
disaggregate segmentation of payment data should be noted at this point. The ARMS survey
collected market loss assistance data jointly with disaster payments whereas the aggregate
FSA data groups counter-cyclical payments (the successor to the market loss assistance
program) together with xed, direct payments. In light of this fact, we group together direct
and counter-cyclical payments for the disaggregated data and direct payments, market loss
assistance, and counter-cyclical payments for the aggregate data. Finally, we have a category
of all other payments which consists of conservation payments, state and local government
benets, and any other miscellaneous government subsidies.
The model of observed payments suggests that an additional dollar of LDP payments
(direct price supports) will increase land values by only $2.38 per acre. When realized
payments are replaced by the ve year average at the county level, the LDP eect rises to
$21.07, again perhaps reecting the attenuation biases inherent in using observed payments
in any given year on an individual farm. The signicantly higher value of an additional
dollar of price support is consistent with expectations and suggests a reasonable discounting
rate close to 5%.
Disaster payments tend to exhibit a large eect on agricultural land values, especially in
the model using aggregate data. These payments are largely ad hoc by design and encompass
a wide range of Congressional objectives. Expectations regarding the impacts of aggregated
disaster payments are unclear since so many dierent programs are of such an ad hoc nature
and are included in this category (see Appendix Table 1). However, direct monetary subsidies
may certainly be expected to raise the returns to ownership of an asset and thus should
increase land values. On the other hand, disaster relief is often targeted to higher risk,
marginal areas. Thus, it would not be unexpected to see disaster payments being correlated
with lower land values. Our results suggest that additional support in the form of disaster
payments does indeed increase asset values in agriculture. An additional $1 of disaster relief
19This particular grouping of payments was dictated by the available FSA data.
23raises land values by $5.02 in the case of the realized payments model (Model 3) and by
$31.10 in the model based upon long-run average values of disaster payments. The 1990s
were a period that experienced signicant ad hoc disaster relief and thus may certainly have
had signicant impacts on farmland values.20
Direct payments also exert a signicant eect on agricultural land values. An additional
dollar in payments raises land values by $2.00 per acre in the model using realized payments
and $5.35 per acre in the model based upon long-run average values. If land market agents
truly believed that these payments were transitory, as the 1996 legislation seemed to imply,
these impacts would seem to be larger than expected.21 It is likely that these payments
were a signal of future benets to be paid on a decoupled basis. Indeed, in its generosity,
Congress not only continued these payments under the 2002 and 2008 farm legislation,
but also expanded and enhanced the benets. More importantly, the new Farm Bill made
soybean acreage eligible for direct payments in 2002. Thus, our results suggest that agents
anticipated such legislative actions| any implicit threats to terminate this avenue of support
with the expiration of the 1996 legislation were heavily discounted.
Similar values of the impacts of market returns and non-agricultural demands for farm-
land are revealed in the disaggregate policy models. A larger impact of market returns is
exhibited in the model using the long-run average value of historical returns than occurs in
the case of realized returns in the year of the survey. Urban pressures again play an impor-
tant role in determining agricultural land values. In every case, the eects are statistically
signicant.
In all, the results conrm that government payments exert a signicant eect on land
values. The (marginal) rates of capitalization suggest that in the current policy context, a
dollar in benets typically raises land values by $13-$30 per acre, with the response diering
substantially across dierent types of policies. This response certainly suggest that agents
20A 2006 report from the Environmental Working Group (EWG, 2006) reports that U.S. taxpayers provided
nearly $26 billion in emergency agricultural disaster aid to more than two million farm and ranch operations
over the 1985-2005 period, with payouts exceeding one billion dollars in 11 of the 21 years.
21Cynics often note that, beyond na ve academics, few farm policy observers believed these so-called
transition payments were temporary. The empirical evidence has conrmed such suspicions.
24expect these benets to be sustained for some time. In terms of the implications for the
distribution of farm program benets, our results conrm that a substantial share of the
benets is captured by landowners. Recall that, in many cases, landowners may be a very
dierent entity than farmers. Farmers wishing to expand or enter production will realize
much smaller benets than the policy rhetoric tries to substantiate. An important nding
is that market returns, which are much more volatile than government payment benets,
tend to have a much lower inuence on land values. Such returns have often been negative
over the last several years and the degree of volatility increases at less aggregate levels of
measurement.
The results on farm land values provide evidence that land captures policy benets as
land values are enhanced by the subsidies. When the farm operator owns the land, the
transfers go to him. Likewise in the absence of eective limits on payments (there are none)
the larger a farm is the greater will be total payment benets.22 However, as we have noted
above, about 45% of U.S. farmland is operated by someone other than the owner.
This raises the important question|how do the generous provisions for support of agri-
culture aect the signicant share of farmers that rent the land used in production? Likewise,
how much of the support goes to landowners? Again, the stated intent of the legislation is
a \fair and equitable" sharing of program payments, with an owner that shares no risk (i.e.,
rents under cash lease arrangements) receiving none of the benets. The real answer to this
question lies in an evaluation of the terms of lease arrangements|do lease rates reect pol-
icy benets? If, as we have demonstrated, the value of land is increased by policy transfers,
given that value of land is a present discounted value of expected cash ows plus an option
to convert, one would expect that lease rates reect payments from the government. Lease
rates provide direct evidence on the proportion of farm payments passed on to landlords,
something much more dicult to assess from land values.
22The extent to which farm program payments should be limited was an important point of considerable
debate in recent farm bill deliberations. Any support based on production (such as LDP payments) will
naturally favor larger producers. In the end, any limits on benets tied directly to production were eliminated
in 2008 and very loose income \means-tests" were imposed. Goodwin (2008) investigated the likely impacts
of binding payment limits and found that, for the vast majority of producers, limits have no impact on
production.
25For those farmers in our sample that were engaged in renting land, we were able to obtain
the rental rates paid per acre for land rented under both share and cash arrangements. This is
an important distinction since both types of rental arrangements are common. In our sample,
65.6% of farm operators reported renting some land and of those that rented, 84.6% used
cash leases, 37.8% used share leases, and 22.4% used both cash and share leases. Previous
research (e.g., Kirwan 2009) has focused on analysis of cash rental agreements in evaluating
the incidence of benets among tenants and landlords.
It is likely that some frictions exist in lease arrangements for farm land, since these
arrangements may not be negotiated every year. In this light, it may take some time for lease
markets to respond to increases or decreases in the level of support provided to producers,
in particular for cash leases. On the other hand, we should expect share lease payments to
reect the ex-post contribution of every single source of agricultural earnings. Share rents
are indeed paid at the end of the season, once all uncertainty has been realized. Share lease
payments are supposed to reect the agreed proportion of cash ows from all sources of
earnings related to the farming of the land, including government payments, though again
share arrangements may be subject to the terms set through individual negotiations. In both
share and cash leases, the terms of the lease are set in advance of the realization of farm
earnings and program benets, at least in most cases. Thus, it is again the case that rental
rates will be based upon expectations of returns and further that the terms of the lease are
set prior to the realization of these returns.
A subtle distinction exists in the role of expectations in our analysis of land values
and rental rates. The data are collected early in the year following the survey year. At
this point, survey respondents have full knowledge regarding realized payment benets and
market returns and are free to factor such knowledge into their assessment of land values.
However, as we have noted, it is not realized payments in the preceding year but rather
long-run payment expectations that will inuence land values. In the case of rental rates,
realized returns and policy benets are not known at the time lease terms are determined.
In the end, the distinction does not alter the fundamental analysis in that a measure of
26expectations of payments and market returns is necessary. To this end, we again utilize
the historical ve-year average value of the payment variables and of market returns. In
addition, we adopt an approach similar to that used by Patton et al. (2008) and utilize
the generalized method of moments approach of Hansen and Singleton (1982) and utilize
instrumental variables to model expectations. We choose instruments available in agents'
information sets at the time rental terms are dened.
We considered regressions of cash and share rents, respectively, against the factors ex-
pected to be relevant to land values and rents, including the indicators of expected payments.
The results are presented in Tables 4-7. We consider both aggregate policy benets (for all
programs at the farm level) and the alternative specication which distinguishes benets
from dierent types of policies. Table 4 presents estimates from a regression of farm-level
cash rental rates on aggregated, historical payment benets (Model 5) and the GMM esti-
mates that are based upon instruments that include lagged payment variables, pre-planting
futures prices, annual xed eects, and lagged county-level market returns (Model 6).
The key question is the extent to which higher government payments are reected in
higher cash rental rates. Kirwan (2009) found that the incidence of subsidy benets fell
mainly upon tenants, who received about $0.79 of each $1 of total payments. Put dierently,
cash rents tended to increase by $0.21 for each $1 of payments. However, as we have noted
above, these estimates may be subject to measurement error biases due to the ignorance
of share leases and the assumption that payment benets are pre-determined by exogenous
policy parameters. It is again important to note that payments are delivered to farmers
through many dierent mechanisms and in most cases are unknown until after harvest.
Our analysis reveals a substantially higher share of payments being distributed to land-
lords engaged in cash rental arrangements with farmer tenants. For each $1 of aggregated
payments (across all program types), landlords claim $0.32 in benets, other things con-
stant. When actual payment receipts are used within an IV-GMM context (Model 6), this
amount rises to $1. This does seem unreasonably high but both results are indicative of a
situation somewhat counter to the results of Kirwan (2009) in which landlords are eective
27at extracting payment benets through higher cash leases. Table 5 presents results for dis-
aggregated programs. The results again indicate that landlords are eective in extracting a
large share of payment benets through higher cash rental rates. In the model using histor-
ical average payments (Model 7), cash rents rise anywhere from $0.73-$1.64 for each $1 of
payments received, depending on the program mechanism used to deliver these payments.
Direct payments, which are not tied to production and which, at least in part, were known
with certainty over the period of study, raise rents by $0.73 for each additional $1 of pay-
ments. Disaster payments are actually correlated with lower cash rents, a result that is not
consistent with our earlier ndings regarding land values. However, disaster payments are,
by denition, directed toward more marginal areas of production and therefore may be cor-
related with lower productivity and lower rents. The results again indicate a relatively low
incidence of market returns on cash rental rates. The GMM estimates (Model 8) imply even
larger impacts of payments on cash rents, though the general implications of the analysis
are the same|landlords are eective at extracting policy benets through higher cash rental
rates.
Table 6 repeats the analysis for share rental rates. An important point regarding the
construction of share rental rates should be noted. These rental rates include payments
going directly to the landlord. This allows a direct comparison with cash rental rates. If
the landlord's direct share of payments were removed from the calculation of rental rates,
one would expect coecients to be zero if the landlords were unable to extract additional
benets through higher share rates. The results are largely similar to those for cash rental
rates, with an additional $1 of total payments raising share rental rates by $0.50-$1.16 per
acre. This again indicates that landlords are likely able to extract additional policy benets
beyond those received directly, though if the rental agreements are on a 50-50 share basis,
the lower estimate would suggest no additional benets for landlords over those that they
receive directly.23 Again, signicant dierences in rental impacts of policies are apparent
across dierent policy types. Disaster payments tend to lower share rental rates, though the
23Legislation mandates a \fair and equitable" allocation of policy benets, which in share leases typically
corresponds to the overall terms of the share lease.
28eect is statistically signicant only in the case of the GMM estimates (Model 12). This is
consistent with expectations in that share lease rates are usually considered to carry a risk
premium over cash rental arrangements. To the extent that disaster payments lower risk as
they are designed to do, they should lower share rental rates. Each additional $1 in direct
payments raise share rental rates by $0.33-$0.70, again indicating a signicant benet for
landlords.
The typical approach to the assessment of the total contribution of agricultural policy
to land values relies on the coecient from the land value regressions. This is problematic
for two reasons. The rst one, usually mentioned in the literature, is due to the fact that
regressions yield the eects of the marginal dollar for each type of policy. The literature has
however overlooked the second reason. If we think about land as a portfolio of securities
each delivering its stream of cash ow, it is obvious that the risk of the portfolio depends
on the covariance of the various underlying securities. Therefore, eliminating one or more
of the underlying securities will aect the risk of the portfolio. In terms of the analysis of
the policy contribution, this implies that eliminating a policy which provides an insurance
benet will not only decrease expected returns, it will also increase the volatility of the
remaining (market) returns. In other words, we should expect the coecient on market
earnings to decrease in response to an increase in uncertainty. The capitalization rate of
earnings will be lower reecting the higher opportunity cost of capital for an asset with more
volatile earnings.
This raises the following question: if there is a theoretical argument in favor of an in-
surance component to the contribution of agricultural policy to land, can we nd evidence
from the market that it matters quantitatively? Unfortunately, there are no counties tar-
geted by the ARMS survey that exempt all farmers from the benets of agricultural policy.
However, as we have noted above, farm land is rented under both cash lease and share lease
arrangement. Cash lease rate are set ex-ante while the share payment depends upon the
actual earning of the parcel, thus implying a risk sharing arrangement.
29The main programs designed to reduce the variability of farm earnings and insure the
cash ow to farmers are price supports and disaster payment programs. If the insurance
component matters, we should nd that higher payments should be correlated with a lower
risk premium on rental arrangements. By committing to an ex-ante xed payment, the
farmer provides insurance to his landlord for which we should expect him to be rewarded
(unless we observe cash rents only when the farmer is not risk averse).
To evaluate this risk premium, for the subset of 11,227 farms that have both cash and
share rental agreements in place, we consider the impact of dierent policies on the share-
cash rental rate dierential. These results are presented in Table 8. We nd that disaster
payments do indeed tend to exhibit an insurance benet eect in that they lower the share-
cash rental rate dierential. In contrast, LDP payments tend to increase the dierential. The
insurance properties of disaster payments are obvious but reason for the positive relationship
between LDP payments and the risk premia is less clear. Because LDP payments tend to
be higher for crops and regions that experience more price volatility, this may reect the
greater price risk associated with such crops and regions. The category of \other payments"
appears to lower the share-cash dierential, likely reecting the insurance benets provided
by this large grouping of payments, which includes conservation program payments.
5 Concluding Remarks
Policy rhetoric often justies Farm Bill expenditures with the argument that impoverished
farmers are in need of governmental support to remain in business. This view is pervasive
outside of Washington. For example, consider the annual \Farm Aid" events intended to
draw attention to the plight of the American farmer. Our analysis challenges this view. We
demonstrate that land owners capture substantial benets from agricultural policy. This is
particularly problematic given that in many cases land owners are distinct from the farmers
whose plight we are told we should be concerned with.
30Of course, many farmers are also landowners and thus have an important stake in main-
taining agricultural policy benets. A farmer that purchased land which reected the value
of anticipated benets would certainly suer a damaging capital loss if such support were
to be withdrawn. Furthermore, all farmers have a strong interest in congressional surprises
whereby more transfers are allocated than anticipated by the land market. As owners they
benet from the unexpected capital gains. The 2002 and 2008 Farm Bills, with their large
increases in support expenditures, may have been such nice surprises.
Tenants also gain from positive surprises as long as lease rates do not adjust instanta-
neously. However, the 2002 Farm Bill seems to have shut down this avenue for a temporary
increase in the share of transfers captured by farm operators. One valuable provision of the
bill is that it oers to farmers the opportunity to update the factors which determine the
level of some of the payments they receive. The power to decide whether or not to update
has been given to the owners of the land, not the operator. Not surprisingly, tenant farmers
complained that land owners used this opportunity to impose a renegotiation of the existing
leases that did not foresee the generosity of the 2002 Farm Bill. No base updating provisions
were included in the 2008 legislation. However, the precedent for such updating has been
established and agents most certainly have some expectation, however much it is discounted,
that such future opportunities will again be presented.
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34Table 2. Aggregated Policy Models of Land Value Determinants:
Parameter Estimates and Summary Statistics a
Model 1 Model 2
Variable Estimate t-Ratio Estimate t-Ratio
Intercept 2995:9138 131:69 2679:4802 107:68
(22:7502) (24:8831)
Total Payments 2:9304 17:62 13:1309 32:19
(0:1664) (0:4080)
Market Returns 3:1442 64:00 3:4549 58:92
(0:0491) (0:0586)
Population Growth 385:1069 70:40 408:7445 73:49
(5:4701) (5:5623)
Urban1  1395:2725  58:38  1290:0735  53:57
(23:8995) (24:0821)
Urban2  931:7608  28:70  879:6743  27:00
(32:4653) (32:5752)
Urban3  667:5923  19:97  626:3230  18:69
(33:4375) (33:5112)
Population / Farm Acres 0:4298 0:76 15:9674 11:62
(0:5657) (1:3747)
........................................................................................
Observations Used 83;936 83;790
R2 0:1766 0:1758
a Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Model 1 uses current year realized values for
payments and market returns. Model 2 uses the historical average values of payments and
market returns over the preceding 5-year period to represent expected values.
35Table 3. Disaggregate Policy Models of Land Value Determinants:
Parameter Estimates and Summary Statistics
Model 3 Model 4
Variable Estimate t-Ratio Estimate t-Ratio
Intercept 2911:0958 106:31 2649:6005 104:40
(27:3840) (25:3794)
Other Payments 3:1634 8:44  0:9048  0:49
(0:3747) (1:8495)
LDP Payments 2:3818 3:96 21:0658 11:58
(0:6015) (1:8189)
Direct Payments 2:0045 3:96 5:3529 4:71
(0:5056) (1:1370)
Disaster Payments 5:0215 13:94 31:1035 10:36
(0:3602) (3:0022)
Market Returns 2:7420 42:88 3:3864 56:48
(0:0639) (0:0600)
Population Growth 350:4934 53:12 403:5037 72:22
(6:5988) (5:5875)
Urban1  1414:6055  49:38  1242:8038  50:91
(28:6454) (24:4121)
Urban2  936:4743  24:04  849:7788  26:01
(38:9550) (32:6728)
Urban3  631:2550  15:84  607:3020  18:07
(33:6108)
Population / Farm Acres  0:2463(0:5744)  0:43 36:9117 20:16
(0:4041) (1:8312)
........................................................................................
Observations Used 53;542 83;135
R2 0:1645 0:1786
a Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Model 3 uses current year realized values for
payments and market returns. Model 4 uses the historical average values of payments and
market returns over the preceding 5-year period to represent expected values.
36Table 4. Aggregate Models of Cash Rental Rate Determinants:
Parameter Estimates and Summary Statistics
Model 5 Model 6
Variable Estimate t-Ratio Estimate t-Ratio
Intercept 74:7981 68:02 56:4471 47:51
(1:0997) (1:1882)
Total Payments 0:3207 39:76 1:0137 52:89
(0:0081) (0:0192)
Aggregate Market Returns 0:0785 30:98 0:1159 38:42
(0:0025) (0:0030)
Population Growth 3:6276 13:31 5:5842 20:31
(0:2726) (0:2750)
Urban1  15:3141  13:22  12:9287  11:28
(1:1581) (1:1460)
Urban2  14:7203  9:4  13:3325  8:61
(1:5652) (1:5482)
Urban3  17:2977  10:78  15:6342  9:85
(1:6046) (1:5869)
Population / Farm Acres 0:7389 8:96 0:8131 8:87
(0:0825) (0:0917)
........................................................................................
Observations Used 50;611 50;571
R2 0:0601 0:0806
a Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Model 5 uses current year realized values for
payments and market returns. Model 6 uses the historical average values of payments and
market returns over the preceding 5-year period to represent expected values.
37Table 5. Disaggregate Models of Cash Rental Rate Determinants:
Parameter Estimates and Summary Statistics
Model 7 Model 8
Variable Estimate t-Ratio Estimate t-Ratio
Intercept 58:4650 48:8 54:9059 17:21
(1:1981) (3:1901)
Other Payments 0:9007 10:72 2:2508 7:27
(0:0840) (0:3098)
LDP Payments 1:6367 20:93 2:9856 8:84
(0:0782) (0:3379)
Direct Payments 0:7295 14:73 0:6020 3:22
(0:0495) (0:1867)
Disaster Payments  2:1341  15:28  4:2835  8:74
(0:1397) (0:4904)
Market Returns 0:1287 42:17 0:1574 21:53
(0:0031) (0:0073)
Population Growth 6:0780 22:14 4:3409 7:22
(0:2745) (0:6013)
Urban1  12:2037  10:6  12:9420  5:1
(1:1510) (2:5388)
Urban2  13:0745  8:48  12:1397  3:58
(1:5424) (3:3888)
Urban3  15:9286  10:07  18:5700  5:52
(1:5814) (3:3651)
Population / Farm Acres 0:9721 11:99 1:2248 6:87
(0:0811) (0:1783)
........................................................................................
Observations Used 50;115 32;526
R2 0:0962 0:0336
a Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Model 7 uses the historical average values of
payments and market returns over the preceding 5-year period to represent expected values.
Model 8 uses GMM-IV estimation methods to incorporate expectations of current period
values.
38Table 6. Aggregate Models of Share Rental Rate Determinants:
Parameter Estimates and Summary Statistics
Model 9 Model 10
Variable Estimate t-Ratio Estimate t-Ratio
Intercept 98:0877 48:34 81:5600 37:65
(2:0291) (2:1665)
Total Payments 0:4978 31:64 1:1635 35:94
(0:0157) (0:0324)
Aggregate Market Returns 0:0527 7:25 0:1421 16:26
(0:0073) (0:0087)
Population Growth 5:4354 11:14  22:6754  10:66
(0:4878) (2:1265)
Urban1  23:7259  11:09  8:5924  3:07
(2:1400) (2:8032)
Urban2  7:8767  2:79  11:2415  3:81
(2:8187) (2:9505)
Urban3  12:9986  4:38 7:0523 14:44
(2:9671) (0:4884)
Population / Farm Acres  0:3355  1:53  0:2611  1:20
(0:2189) (0:2177)
........................................................................................
Observations Used 23;627 23;601
R2 0:0594 0:0716
a Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Model 9 uses current year realized values for
payments and market returns. Model 10 uses the historical average values of payments and
market returns over the preceding 5-year period to represent expected values.
39Table 7. Disaggregate Models of Share Rental Rate Determinants:
Parameter Estimates and Summary Statistics
Model 11 Model 12
Variable Estimate t-Ratio Estimate t-Ratio
Intercept 84:3849 37:18 65:8711 9:77
(2:2697) (6:7400)
Other Payments  0:2209  1:04 6:8322 6:35
(0:2124) (1:0758)
LDP Payments 2:4906 21:08 0:0008 0:00
(0:1182) (0:6939)
Direct Payments 0:3302 4:45 0:6957 2:57
(0:0741) (0:2703)
Disaster Payments  0:2583  0:85  4:5738  5:55
(0:3030) (0:8248)
Market Returns 0:1390 15:88 0:1772 7:48
(0:0088) (0:0237)
Population Growth 6:6198 13:58 3:4059 3:41
(0:4876) (0:9993)
Urban1  21:6807  10:14  26:8882  6:51
(2:1379) (4:1282)
Urban2  8:5882  3:08  10:1961  1:87
(2:7916) (5:4412)
Urban3  11:7639  4:00  13:5427  2:32
(2:9416) (5:8366)
Population / Farm Acres  0:2124  0:98  0:0287  0:05
(0:2167) (0:6288)
........................................................................................
Observations Used 23;466 15;143
R2 0:0852 0:0352
a Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Model 11 uses the historical average values of
payments and market returns over the preceding 5-year period to represent expected values.
Model 12 uses GMM-IV estimation methods to incorporate expectations of current period
values.
40Table 8. Analysis of Share-Cash Rental Rate Dierentials:
Parameter Estimates and Summary Statistics
Model 13 Model 14
Variable Estimate t-Ratio Estimate t-Ratio
Intercept 13:5978 10:38 26:9354 4:50
(1:3106) (5:9900)
Other Payments  0:1328  1:04  2:7560  2:29
(0:1282) (1:2040)
LDP Payments 0:0966 1:36 2:1743 3:00
(0:0713) (0:7236)
Direct Payments 0:0660 1:40  0:1708  0:94
(0:0471) (0:1827)
Disaster Payments  0:7841  3:95  2:1911  2:85
(0:1985) (0:7698)
Market Returns  0:0214  3:39 0:0184 0:93
(0:0063) (0:0197)
Population Growth 0:2551 0:88 0:0415 0:07
(0:2908) (0:6037)
Urban1  2:9239  2:35  0:8763  0:34
(1:2449) (2:5514)
Urban2  3:4084  2:12  1:4991  0:45
(1:6064) (3:3340)
Urban3 1:8332 1:11 1:4492 0:42
(1:6534) (3:4305)
Population / Farm Acres 0:0189 0:20  0:5210  1:21
(0:0960) (0:4293)
........................................................................................
Observations Used 11;227 7;514
R2 0:0069 0:0021
a Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Model 13 uses the historical average values of
payments and market returns over the preceding 5-year period to represent expected values.







































































































































































































































































































A.  US Total










































































C. Kossuth County Iowa
Net Revenue Govt. Payments
Figure 3: Net Revenues and Government Payments for US, Iowa, and Kossuth County Iowa
44Appendix Table 1. USDA Program Payments by Category:
Outlays, and Number of Recipients (1990-2005)
Program Total No. Recipients
..........................................Coupled Payments ..........................................
Acreage Grazing Payments 11,475,210 9,386
Barley Assessment Deciency 37,303,627 89,793
Cotton Deciency 3,434,395,526 694,440
Crop Special Grade Rice LDP 4,719,159 285
Feed Grain Deciency 15,328,664,623 6,072,369
LDP, Non-Contract PFC Growers 85,305,152 58,536
Loan Deciency 29,732,547,354 5,192,213
Market Gains 4,476,129,696 633,196
Rice Deciency 3,338,380,074 218,421
Rice Marketing 34,014,757 20,274
Wheat Deciency 7,923,366,487 3,223,695
Winter Wheat Deciency 682,864,667 248,373
...........................................Direct Payments ...........................................
Amlap - Apportioned 94,934,998 7,647
Apple Market Loss Assistance 166,373,534 13,160
Dairy Market Loss Assistance 968,612,817 187,732
Direct And Counter Cyclical 25,068,153,272 4,218,971
Lamb Meat Adjustment Assist 86,071,348 71,706
Marketing Loss Assistance 18,260,407,458 5,366,287
Oilseed Program 950,113,825 1,184,806
Peanut Marketing Assistance 119,010,211 27,094
Peanut Marketing Asst Pgm III 53,924,599 17,277
Production Flexibility 35,210,684,603 9,667,805
Suplemental Oilseed Payment Program 418,811,924 586,572
Supplemental Tobacco Loss 127,461,626 335,871
Tobacco Loss Assistance 346,044,295 361,113
WAMLAP II - Apportioned 18,637,475 20,985
WAMLAP III - Apportioned 16,730,874 20,974
Wool and Mohair Market Loss Asst. 10,228,857 18,629
..........................................Disaster Payments ..........................................
01-02 Crop Disaster Assistance 2,547,849,688 389,516
2000 Florida Nursery Losses 29,437 3
AILFP { Apportioned 6,480,878 1,180
American Indian-Livestock Feed 12,458,007 2,389
Apple and Potato Quality Loss 34,199,943 1,681
Avian Inuenza Indemnity Prog 52,980,294 163
Cattle Feed Program 136,401,954 49,580
Citrus Losses In California 2,154,433 987
Crop Disaster Program 3,060,477,581 555,263
Crop Loss Disaster Assistance 1,857,480,163 249,555
45Appendix Table 1. (continued)
Program Total No. Recipients
....................................Disaster Payments (continued) ....................................
Dairy Disaster Assistance 7,495,444 1,161
Dairy Indemnity 2,450,691 456
Disaster 5,532,181,025 1,504,547
Disaster { Non-Program Crops 42,215 29
Disaster { Program Crops -112,369 74
Disaster Reserve Assistance 145,110,728 85,247
Emergency Conservation 312,905,164 124,459
Emergency Conservation Program 70,106,623 26,205
Emergency Feed -1,029,779 1,303
Flood Compensation Program 706,144 38
Idaho Oust Program 4,888,638 71
Karnal Bunt Fungus Payment 38,897,325 912
LIP - Contract Growers 1,031,180 1,229
Livestock Compensation Program 1,096,133,267 578,840
Livestock Emergency Assistance 1,550,736,935 781,983
Livestock Indemnity Program 305,696 164
NAP-Supplemental Appropriation 3,917,572 1,379
Noninsured Assistance Program 672,291,473 170,099
Nursery Losses - Florida 7,316,930 195
Pasture Flood Compensation 20,387,735 12,252
Pasture Recovery Program 52,971,866 35,093
Poultry Enteritis Syndrome 1,768,271 136
Quality Losses Program 148,615,562 35,246
Sugar Beet Disaster Program 45,636,494 2,745
Tobacco Disaster Assistance 2,696,981 343
...........................................Other Payments ...........................................
Additional Interest 56,214 279
Agricultural Conservation 1,132,520,907 739,873
Agricultural Management Assist 5,752,517 796
Animal Waste Management 256,368 26
Arkansas Beaver Lake 2,464,632 477
Auto Ag Cons Pg Env. Long Term 402,632 109
Auto Ag Con Pg Env. Annual 1,163 1
Auto Ana-Conservation Annual 1,875 2
Auto CRP - Cost Shares 353,698,363 143,683
Auto EQIP 173,468,007 37,592
Auto LTA-Conservation Long Term 704,059 164
Clean Lakes 9,999 1
46Appendix Table 1. (continued)
Program Total No. Recipients
.....................................Other Payments (continued) .....................................
Colorado River Salinity 31,832,222 1,992
Cotton Diversion -15,095 22
CRP Annual Rental 24,695,070,732 5,701,530
CRP Cost-Shares 840,994,086 429,665
CRP Incentives 483,637,540 219,732
Dairy Termination 237,026,377 19,893
Environment Quality Incentives 477,768,620 126,317
Extended Farm Storage 171,409,332 72,879
Extended Warehouse Storage 44,481,468 18,694
Feed Grain Diversion -395,250 4,040
Finality Rule 1,007,752 1,403
Forestry Incentive - Annual 51,322,552 25,100
Forestry Incentive - Long Term 12,254,173 6,120
Fresh Market Peaches Program 783,991 126
Grasslands Reserve Program 9,275 4
Hard White Winter Wheat 3,517,590 3,301
Interest On CCC-6'S 1,624 38
Interest On NAP Payment 4,678 184
Interest Payments 29,003,888 1,046,365
Klamath Basin Water Program -4,299 4
Milk Diversion 30,576 20
Milk Inc Loss Contr Transition 547,209,081 73,836
Milk Income Loss Contract 1,403,354,665 247,585
Milk Marketing Fee 265,896,171 249,035
National Wool Act 895,921,293 442,720
NRCS EQIP 283,707,027 32,930
Options Pilot Program 39,762,496 4,128
Payment Limitation Refund -6,983,394 2,411
Peanut Quota Buyout Program 1,220,640,857 80,080
Potato Diversion Program 20,263,929 1,222
Rice Diversion -12,567 11
Rural Clean Water 3,126,831 618
Small Hog Operation Program 121,376,613 57,952
Soil/Water Conservation Assist 10,358,605 2,383
Sugar PIK Diversion Program 180,690,205 15,126
Tobacco Payment Program 50,887,278 297,921
Water Bank - Annual 43,879,235 30,317
Water Bank-Practice Cost/Share 11,046,258 7,682
Wetlands Reserve 34,315,395 1,830
Wheat Diversion -2,237 85
47